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Abstract
We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a
random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a
single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous
to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each
coalition its optimal expected profit. A similar game (modeled in terms of costs) was
considered by Mu¨ller et al. (2002), who proved that this game is balanced for every
possible joint distribution of the random demands.
In this paper we consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of
newsvendors. We prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game,
and we show that in a game with a continuum of players, under a nonatomic condition
on the demand, the core is a singleton. For a particular class of demands we show how
the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases.
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1 Introduction
The newsvendor problem is a classic textbook example in optimization. A newsvendor sells a
product (newspapers) during a short selling period (a morning) with stochastic demand. The
newsvendor can order inventory before the selling period and has no additional replenishment
opportunity. If the order quantity is greater than the realized demand, the newsvendor must
dispose of the remaining stock at a loss. If the order quantity is lower than realized demand,
the newsvendor forgoes some profit. Therefore, in choosing an order quantity the newsvendor
must balance the costs of ordering too little against the costs of ordering too much. For a
survey of this problem see for instance Petruzzi and Dada (1999).
In recent years strategic versions of the newsvendor problem have been considered by
several authors. The reader is referred to Cachon and Netessine (2004) for a nice survey of
both cooperative and noncooperative models in supply chain.
Noncooperative versions of the newsvendor game appear in different variations. For in-
stance Parlar (1988), Wang and Parlar (1994), Ernst and Kouvelis (1999), and Netessine
and Rudi (2003) study the role of inventory in the competition among retailers and deter-
mine uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Lippman and McCardle (1997) study competition
between firms in a single-period setting, where a consumer may switch among firms to find
available inventory. In Cachon and Lariviere (1999a,b) retailers behave strategically when
ordering from a supplier with limited capacity.
Cooperative versions have been considered for instance by Eppen (1979), Gerchak and
Gupta (1991), Robinson (1993), Hartman and Dror (1996), Hartman et al. (2000), Mu¨ller
et al. (2002), and Slikker et al. (2005). In a cooperative newsvendor game several retailers
can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their
behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers.
Otherwise some of them will prefer not to join the centralized inventory.
If we assign to each coalition the expected profit that it obtains if it stocks the optimal
number of newspapers (as in the single-newsvendor model), then we have a cooperative
game in characteristic form. Every newsvendor will find convenient to build the centralized
inventory if the core of the game is nonempty (i.e., if the game is balanced). Mu¨ller et al.
(2002) model a newsvendor game in terms of costs (rather than profits), and prove that
if the costs are linear and homogeneous across newsvendors, then the newsvendor game is
balanced for every possible joint distribution of the random demands. Slikker et al. (2005)
prove a similar result for games modeled in terms of profits, when transshipment costs are
taken into account.
In this paper we consider large newsvendor games. In order to prove our results it is
useful to see the newsvendor game as an infinite-dimensional measure game as in Milchtaich
(1998). This allows to treat both finite and infinite games. The core of the game is now a
set of charges (finitely additive measures) that dominate the game. A section of the paper
will be devoted to nonatomic newsvendor games, namely, to games where the influence of
each newsvendor is negligible.
A huge literature exists on nonatomic games. The basic framework is Aumann and
Shapley (1974), which, although more oriented towards the theory of value, contains the
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foundations of cooperative games where each single agent is negligible. Some classical fore-
runners are the papers by Aumann (1964, 1966) on nonatomic competitive economies. The
connection between large and nonatomic games has been studied, among others, by Debreu
and Scarf (1963), Kannai (1970), and Debreu (1975). Interesting surveys can be found,
e.g., in Debreu and Scarf (1972), Hildenbrand (1974), and Anderson (1986, 1992). Major
contributions on the core of infinite TU games are due to Schmeidler (1967), Kannai (1969),
Schmeidler (1972), and Delbaen (1974). A survey of the area and general proofs of the main
results can be found in Marinacci and Montrucchio (2004).
Several results that are in the same spirit as those contained in Mu¨ller et al. (2002) are
proved in greater generality with different techniques. For instance here, in order to show
that the game is balanced, a charge, which is always in the core, is explicitly computed.
Conditions for exactness, supermodularity, and positivity of the game are established.
The main result of the paper is that for a nonatomic newsvendor game the core is a
singleton, whenever the aggregate demand has a continuous distribution.
A parametric class of games is then considered and conditions are determined, under
which the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of newsvendors increases. It is shown
that this shrinking does not happen when the random demands are independent.
We want to emphasize that the full force of our results comes from the infinite-dimensional-
measure-game approach proposed by Milchtaich (1998). Our paper provides then an appli-
cation of this approach, and develops techniques that should prove useful in the analysis of
other vector measure games. To show this we briefly consider a class of games, that we call
Markowitz games, to which some results presented for newsvendor games apply.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the newsvendor game is presented and
some general results are stated. Section 3 deals with nonatomic newsvendor games and
provides the main result of the paper. In Section 4 we briefly treat Markowitz games. In
Section 5 a class of newsvendor games with many players is considered and some asymptotic
results are stated. Section 6 studies some useful properties of an operator that is used in the
newsvendor problem. Section 7 contains the proofs of the results.
2 Newsvendor games
2.1 The newsvendor problem
We introduce the newsvendor problem in an abstract setting that will prove suitable for the
analysis of the game.
A newsvendor has to decide how many newspapers to stock in order to face an unknown
demand, knowing that no replenishment is allowed. If she faces a demand x and orders a
quantity y, then she obtains a profit
ψ(x, y) =
{
px− h(y − x) if x ≤ y,
py − pi(x− y) if x > y, (2.1)
for some constants p, h > 0, and pi ≥ 0. The constant p is the price of the newspaper (net
of the wholeseller’s price that the newsvendor has to pay), the constant h represents the
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holding cost of stocking more newspapers than are actually sold, and the constant pi is the
penalty cost of not ordering enough newspapers to meet the demand. This cost can be null.
We consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) on which all random quantities will be defined,
and the space L1 (Ω,F ,P) of all integrable random variables (in fact with a slight abuse
of notation, throughout the paper we identify an integrable random variable Z with its
class of equivalence Z ∈ L1 (Ω,F ,P)). A central role will be played by the operator Π :
L1 (Ω,F ,P)→ R, defined as
Π (X) = max
y∈R
E [ψ (X, y)] . (2.2)
The operator Π represents the expected profit for a newsvendor who orders the optimal
amount of newspapers. Its properties will be studied extensively in Section 6.
Remark 2.1. From an economic viewpoint formula (2.2) should be maxy≥0 E [ψ (X, y)].
On the other hand the function y 7→ E[ψ(X, y)] is concave. If the demand X is positive,
we will show that the maximum is attained at a point y∗ > 0. Therefore, due to well
known properties of concave functions, maximizing over the whole real line or only over its
positive part are equivalent. Definition (2.2) has the advantage of allowing not necessarily
positive demands X. Another way to see this is considering that the operator Π satisfies
Π(X + a) = Π(X) + pa for all scalar a ∈ R.
2.2 The game
A general newsvendor game is defined on a measurable space of agents (I, C). The set I is
a set of players (newsvendors), and C is a σ-algebra of subsets of I. Elements of C are then
feasible coalitions of newsvendors. Any coalition orders a fixed number of newspapers to
face a random demand. As in the newsvendor problem, if a coalition faces a demand x and
orders a quantity y, then it obtains a profit ψ(x, y), where ψ is defined as in (2.1).
The random demand will be represented by a function X : Ω× C → R that satisfies the
following conditions
• for all A ∈ C, the map ω → X (ω,A) is an integrable random variable,
• for all ω ∈ Ω, the map A→ X (ω,A) is an additive measure on (I, C).
We can define an additive vector measure D : C → L1 (Ω,F ,P) as follows: for any coalition A,
D (A) = X (·, A) ∈ L1 (Ω,F ,P), which is interpreted as the joint demand faced by coalition
A. Details about vector measures can be found in the next subsection.
The optimal amount ordered by coalition A is
y∗A = argmax
y∈R
E[ψ(D(A), y)],
that is the amount that maximizes the expected profit for the coalition. We will show that
the maximizer y∗A exists and is a (pi + p)/(h + pi + p)-quantile of the distribution of D(A).
Hence the optimal expected profit for coalition A is
Π(D(A)) = max
y∈R
E[ψ(D(A), y)] = E[ψ(D(A), y∗A)].
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The newsvendor game may then be defined as
ν (A) = Π (D (A)) (2.3)
for all A ∈ C. The amount ν (A) is the profit that members of the coalition A jointly obtain.
Definition (2.3) of newsvendor game through the vector-valued measure A → D (A)
presents some analytical advantage, since the newsvendor game can be viewed as an infinite
dimensional measure game (see Milchtaich (1998)).
Example 2.2. If we set I = {1, 2, . . . , d}, C = 2I , and D ({i}) = Xi ∈ L1 (Ω,F ,P), we get
a finite newsvendor game where ν (A) = Π
(∑
i∈AXi
)
. This game is strongly related to the
one studied by Mu¨ller et al. (2002). The difference is that they defined the game in terms
of costs, whereas here we define it in terms of profits. The two formulations are actually
closely related, as shown by Slikker et al. (2005) in the finite setting, and by formula (7.4)
of Lemma 7.1 in our more general context.
2.3 Notation
Here we introduce some notation and definitions that will be used throughout the paper.
Two random variables X, Y ∈ L1 (Ω,F ,P) are called comonotone if for all ω′ ∈ Ω we
have P (ω : (X (ω)−X (ω′)) (Y (ω)− Y (ω′)) ≥ 0) = 1.
Given a measurable space (I, C), a coalitional game is a set-function ν : C → R such that
ν (∅) = 0. We list some standard terminology utilized in cooperative games literature.
A game ν is
• bounded if supA∈C |ν (A)| < +∞;
• superadditive if ν (A ∪B) ≥ ν (A) + ν (B) for all pairwise disjoint A and B;
• supermodular if ν (A ∪B) + ν (A ∩B) ≥ ν (A) + ν (B) for all A and B;
• additive (a charge) if ν (A ∪B) = ν (A) + ν (B) for all pairwise disjoint A and B;
• σ-additive (a measure) if ν (∪∞n=1An) =
∑∞
n=1 ν(An) whenever Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for i 6= j.
• continuous at A, if limn→∞ ν (An) = ν (A) whenever An ↓ A and An ↑ A;
• continuous if ν is continuous at A for all A ∈ C.
The set of bounded charges (i.e., additive measures) is denoted by ba (C), the set of bounded
measures (i.e., countably additive measures) is denoted by ca (C), and the set of positive
bounded measures is denoted by ca+ (C). Given a positive measure λ, the set of all measures
which are absolutely continuous with respect to λ is denoted by ca (C, λ).
An outcome of the game ν is an element of ba (C). The core of a game ν is the set
core(ν) = {µ ∈ ba (C) : µ (I) = ν (I) and µ(A) ≥ ν(A) for all A ∈ C}.
The core is always a weak*-compact subset of ba (C).
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A game is said to be balanced if core(ν) 6= ∅. Given a game ν and a coalition A ∈ C,
we may consider the game νA : CA → R which is the restriction of ν to the coalitions in
A. A game is totally balanced if core(νA) 6= ∅ for all A ∈ C. Any totally balanced game is
superadditive.
A game ν is exact if core(ν) 6= ∅ and
ν (A) = min
µ∈core(ν)
µ (A) , ∀A ∈ C.
Clearly, any exact game is totally balanced. Furthermore any supermodular and bounded
game is exact. For positive games see Delbaen (1974). As the games under study are not
always positive (see Proposition 2.8) we emphasize the fact that the result continues to hold
for all bounded games (see e.g. Marinacci and Montrucchio (2004)).
2.4 General results
The result that follows is rather general and almost free of assumptions. It shows that the
core of all newsvendor games is nonempty. More importantly, it offers a specific solution in
the core. We will see in the sequel that in the atomic case the core may be quite large. On
the other hand, under some mild conditions, in the nonatomic setting the core turns out be
a singleton, therefore agreeing with the solution (2.4) below.
Theorem 2.3. If the measure A→ D(A) is bounded (i.e. satisfies (7.1)), then any newsven-
dor game is totally balanced. Moreover, if the aggregate demand D (I) has a continuous
distribution, then µ ∈ core(ν), where µ is a bounded charge defined as
µ (A) = (p+ h)
∫
D(I)≤y∗
D (A) dP− pi
∫
D(I)≥y∗
D (A) dP (2.4)
for all A ∈ C, where y∗ is a (pi + p)/ (h+ pi + p)-quantile of D (I).
The element of the core defined by (2.4) is particularly appealing for some classes of
games, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 2.4. Consider a finite newsvendor game with I = Id ≡ {1, . . . , d}. If all the
marginal distributions of the random demands X1, . . . , Xd are equal, then the measure µ
defined by (2.4) is the unique element in core (ν) such that µi = µ({i}) = Π (D (Id)) /d for
all i ∈ Id. Furthermore, µ is the barycenter of core (ν), provided (Xi)i∈Id are exchangeable.
Though all newsvendor games are totally balanced, they are not necessarily exact. Next
proposition states a sufficient condition that ensures this property.
Proposition 2.5. If D (I) and D (A) are comonotone for all coalitions A ∈ C, then the
newsvendor game is exact.
At least an important example is contemplated by this proposition. If there is no aggre-
gate risk, i.e., D (I) is nonrandom, then D (I) and D (A) are comonotone for every A ∈ C.
The following result provides a strong property for newsvendor games with a particular
structure of the demand D. Two random variables X and Y are of the same type, provided
FX (x) = FY (ax+ b), for some a > 0 and b.
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Proposition 2.6. Let the following conditions hold:
(i) all D (A) have finite variance,
(ii) all D (A) such that Var[D(A)] > 0 are of the same type.
Then the newsvendor game is
ν (A) = pE[D(A)]− k
√
Var[D (A)] (2.5)
for some 0 < k ≤ max{h, p+ pi}.
In addition, if the random variables D (A) and D (B) are uncorrelated for all A and B
such that A ∩B = ∅, then the newsvendor game is supermodular.
Specializing Proposition 2.6 to finite games yields a remarkable result when the demands
Xi have Gaussian distributions. We obtain another explicit solution in core (ν). Let ei ∈ Rd
be the vector whose i-th element is 1 and the others are 0. The vector eA is defined as
eA =
∑
i∈A ei.
Proposition 2.7. Let ν be a finite newsvendor game with multinormal demands (Xi)i∈I .
Denoting by mX = (mi) its expectation and by Σ = [σij] its covariance matrix, we have
ν (A) = pm′XeA − k (e′AΣeA)1/2 (2.6)
= p
∑
i∈A
mi − k
 ∑
(i,j)∈A×A
σij
1/2 ,
for all coalitions A ∈ 2I . The measure
µ ({i}) = pmi − k
 ∑
(i,j)∈I×I
σij
−1/2∑
j∈I
σij (2.7)
lies in core(ν).
In addition, if the (Xi)i∈I are exchangeable, with variance σ
2 and correlation coefficient
−1/(d− 1) ≤ ρ ≤ 1, then we get the symmetric game
ν (A) = pm|A| − kσ
√
(1− ρ) |A|+ ρ |A|2, (2.8)
which is supermodular.
As a by-product, Proposition 2.7 shows that the sufficient condition for supermodularity
used in Proposition 2.6 is not necessary.
Solutions (2.7) and (2.4) do not coincide in general. They do when the demands are
exchangeable. In this case, solution (2.7) turns out be the barycenter of core (ν). In super-
modular games the barycenter is necessarily the Shapley value (see Shapley (1971)).
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We close this section with two results on the positivity of the game ν. This implies in
turn that its core contains only nonnegative charges. The first result is obvious and holds
for all p. Actually if pi = 0, choosing y∗ = 0 gives a null expected profit. The second result
holds for sufficiently large prices.
We recall that a family Xα of nonnegative random variables is uniformly integrable if∫
Xα≥N Xα dP→ 0 as N →∞ uniformly in α (see e.g. Dunford and Schwartz (1988)).
Proposition 2.8. Let ν(A) = Π(D(A)), with D(A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈ C.
(i) If pi = 0, then ν(A) ≥ 0 for all p.
(ii) If the family of random variables {D(A)/E[D(A)]} is uniformly integrable when A
varies in {A ∈ C : D(A) 6= 0}, then ν(A) ≥ 0 for all p sufficiently large.
3 Nonatomic newsvendor games
In this section we examine a nonatomic version of the newsvendor game, namely, a version
where there is a continuum of players and each on of them has a negligible weight.
First we state a known result about nonatomic vector measures. We recall that a vector
measure D is said to be nonatomic if D (A) 6= 0 implies the existence of some B ∈ C, with
B ⊆ A, such that D (B) 6= 0 and D (A \B) 6= 0.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that the demand vector measure D has Radom-Nikodym deriva-
tive, i.e., there exist λ ∈ ca+ (C) nonatomic and a λ-measurable, Bochner integrable function
δ : I → L1 (Ω,F ,P), such that
D (A) =
∫
A
δ dλ. (3.1)
Then A 7→ D (A) is nonatomic.
Here
∫
A
δ dλ denotes a Bochner integral. Some more details can be found in Section 7.
The main result of this section establishes that in the nonatomic setting, when the ag-
gregate demand has a continuous distribution, the core of newsvendor games is a singleton.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that in the newsvendor game ν (A) = Π (D (A)) the demand vec-
tor measure satisfies (3.1). Furthermore let the aggregate demand D(I) have a continuous
distribution. Then core (ν) ⊂ L1 (I, C, λ) is a singleton, given by (2.4).
It is well known (see Dunford and Schwartz (1988, Theorem 17, p. 198)) that a perfectly
equivalent way of giving a λ-Bochner integrable function δ : I → L1 (Ω,F ,P) is to assign a
λ⊗ P -integrable function δ : I × Ω→ R such that δ (i) = δ (i, .), λ-a.e., and (∫ δ dλ) (ω) =∫
δ (i, ω) dλ, P -a.e. This allows to explicitly write the density of the unique element µ of
the core as
dµ
dλ
= (p+ h)
∫
D(I)≤y∗
δ (i, ω) dP− pi
∫
D(I)≥y∗
δ (i, ω) dP.
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Theorem 3.2 has an important corollary. The uniqueness of the elements of the core in
Theorem 3.2 requires the additional condition that the demand A→ D (A) is representable
by a Bochner integral. If the range of D (A) lies in some Lp space with p ∈ (1,∞) (this
is the case for instance when the demands are normally distributed) we can dispense with
this assumption, as the reflexive spaces enjoy the Radon-Nydokim property according to a
classical theorem by Phillips (Diestel and Uhl (1977)).
Corollary 3.3. The results of Theorem 3.2 are true for any σ-additive, nonatomic, and
bounded-variation vector measure D : C → Lp (Ω,F ,P), with 1 < p <∞.
Nonatomicity poses restrictions on the distribution of the demands. For instance, the
following proposition shows that the last claim of Proposition 2.6 is not effective in the
nonatomic framework.
Proposition 3.4. Assume that A 7→ D (A) is nonatomic and bounded-variation, and that
the distributions of all D (A) 6= 0 are continous and of the same type, with finite variance.
For each coalition A, for which D (A) 6= 0, there exist two disjoint subcoalitions A1, A2 ⊆ A,
such that Cov[D(A1), D(A2)] 6= 0.
4 Markowitz games
As already mentioned in the introduction, the approach undertaken in this paper for studying
the newsvendor game may be used for other models. We give a flavor of it by briefly
examining a closely related class of games, that we call Markovitz games. A mean-variance
approach a` la Markowitz has been used in the nonstrategic newsvendor problem by Choi
et al. (2001).
Let A → F (A) ∈ L2 (Ω,F ,P) be a vector-valued measure defined on (I, C). Given two
positive weights α and β, define the Markovitz game
ν (A) = αE [F (A)]− β
√
Var [F (A)], (4.1)
which has an obvious interpretation assuming that each coalition A evaluates the random re-
turn F (A) according to the mean-variance approach. In view of Proposition 2.6, newsvendor
games are Markovitz games, if the demands F (A) are all of the same type. If we replace the
operator Π with the Markovitz operator M (X) = αE [X] − β√Var [X], mutatis mutandis
all our arguments go through. The following proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 4.1. Assume Var [F (I)] 6= 0 and let F be bounded. The Markovitz game (4.1)
is totally balanced. The charge
µ (A) = αE [F (A)]− β Cov [F (A) , F (I)]√
Var [F (I)]
(4.2)
lies in core (ν). In addition, if F (A) is σ-additive, nonatomic and of bounded variation,
then core (ν) = {µ}.
The charge µ defined in (4.2) coincides with the measure defined in (2.7) whenever the
Markowitz game is a newsvendor game with Gaussian demands.
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5 Large newsvendor games
In view of the results of Section 3 on the uniqueness of elements in the core for nonatomic
newsvendor games, here we study the shrinking of the core of large newsvendor games
as the number of players increases. We restrict our analysis to Gaussian case studied in
Proposition 2.7.
Let Id = {1, . . . , d} be the set of players. If µ is a measure on Id, we denote by ‖µ‖ =
|µ| (I) =∑di=1 |µ({i})| its total variation norm. For any game ν on Id we define the diameter
of the core of ν as
Φ(ν) = max
µ,µ′∈core(ν)
‖µ− µ′‖ .
We will consider a sequence {νd}d∈N of Gaussian games defined on Id = {1, 2, . . . , d}. A
standardization is necessary to get significant asymptotic results for the diameter of the core.
In view of (2.6) first we notice that the diameter of the core of such games is invariant with
respect to changes of the mean mX of the multinormal demand. Therefore, without any loss
of generality we will assume that mX = 0. Second we impose the normalization condition
νd(Id) = −1. Therefore we get the negative game
νd(A) = −
(
e′AΣdeA
e′IdΣdeId
)1/2
, (5.1)
where Σd is the covariance matrix of the multinormal demand.
Proposition 5.1. Let the demand (X1, . . . , Xd) of the game νd have an exchangeable multi-
normal distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σd, with elements σii(d) = σ
2,
σij(d) = σ
2ρ, for i 6= j, where −1/(d− 1) ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Then
lim
d→∞
Φ(νd) =
{
0 if ρ > 0,
2
√
2− 1 if ρ = 0.
We see therefore that the diameter of the core shrinks only if and only if the correlation
among the demands is positive. If ρ is allowed to vary with d and to assume negative values,
then it is possible that the core does not shrink to a singleton.
Notice that, for fixed d, the diameter diverges to infinity as ρ → −1/(d − 1) (which
corresponds to the case where the aggregate demand is nonrandom).
In the next proposition we will consider a more general case where the correlation coef-
ficients may differ, and we see that the core shrinks to a singleton, provided the covariances
are all bounded away from zero, and the row sums of the covariance matrix are equal.
Proposition 5.2. Let the demand (X1, . . . , Xd) of the game νd be multinormal with mean
0 and covariance matrix Σd, such that σij(d) ≥ η > 0 for all i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and∑d
j=1 σij(d) = k(d) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Then limd→∞Φ(νd) = 0.
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6 The operator Π
Most of the proofs of the results stated in the previous sections rely on properties of the
operator Π defined in (2.2). In this section we study such properties.
Proposition 6.1. The operator Π : L1 (Ω,F ,P)→ R satisfies the following properties
(a) Π is positively homogeneous,
(b) Π is concave,
(c) Π is comonotonically additive, namely, Π(X + Y ) = Π (X) + Π (Y ), whenever X and
Y are comonotone.
(d) Π(X) = E[ψ(X, y∗)], where y∗ is a (pi+ p)/(h+ pi+ p)-quantile of the distribution of X.
The following useful result establishes the Lipschitz continuity of Π.
Proposition 6.2. For all X, Y ∈ L1 (Ω,F ,P) we have
|Π(X)− Π(Y )| ≤ γ ‖X − Y ‖ , (6.1)
with γ = max {h+ p, pi + 2p}.
By (6.1), the operator Π is continuous. Hence, Π is a support function (see for in-
stance Ho¨rmander (1955)). For X ∈ L1 (Ω,F ,P) and Y ∈ L∞ (Ω,F ,P) we write 〈X, Y 〉 =∫
XY dP = E [XY ]. By Hormander’s theorem, there exists a unique weak∗-compact and
convex set Π∗ ⊂ L∞ (Ω,F ,P) such that
Π (X) = min
Y ∈Π∗
〈Y,X〉 . (6.2)
The next proposition, which plays an important role in the proof of many of our results,
provides a complete characterization of the set Π∗.
Proposition 6.3. Y ∈ Π∗ if and only if
(i)
∫
Y dP = p,
(ii) −pi ≤ Y ≤ p+ h P-a.s.
In addition, if X has continuous distribution, then there exists a unique Y ∈ Π∗ such that
Π(X) =
〈
Y ,X
〉
, (6.3)
whose expression is
Y = (p+ h)1{X≤y∗} − pi1{X≥y∗}. (6.4)
where y∗ is a (pi + p)/ (h+ pi + p)-quantile of the distribution of X.
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Remark 6.4. The set of Y ∈ Π∗ such that Π (X) = 〈Y,X〉 can be studied also when the
distribution of X is not continuous. As long as P (X = y∗) = 0 it is clear from the proof of
Proposition 6.3 that Π∗ remains a singleton.
Remark 6.5. By convex analysis, it turns out that Π∗ = ∂Π(0), where ∂Π(0) is the
superdifferential of the concave function Π. Likewise, the set of elements Y ∈ Π∗ such that
Π (X) = 〈X, Y 〉 is nothing but ∂Π(X). Therefore saying that ∂Π(X) is a singleton, when
X has continuous distribution, amounts to affirming that Π is Gateaux differentiable at X
(some more details are discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.2).
7 Proofs
First we introduce some more notation and known results that will be used throughout the
proofs.
Given a game ν, a coalition N ∈ C is ν-null, whenever ν (A ∪N) = ν (A) for all A ∈ C.
For λ ∈ ca+ (C), a game ν is called λ-continuous if λ (A) = 0 implies that A is ν-null.
As well known, ba (C) is (isometrically isomorphic to) the norm dual of the space B (C)
of all bounded and measurable functions (endowed with the supnorm), the duality being
〈f, µ〉 = ∫ f dµ, with f ∈ B (C) and µ ∈ ba (C). We consider the relevant subset B1 (C) =
{f ∈ B (C) : 0 ≤ f ≤ 1}, whose members are often called ideal coalitions (see Aumann and
Shapley (1974)).
The set of ideal coalitions can be endowed with the na-topology due to Aumann and
Shapley (1974), which is the coarsest topology for which all the functionals f 7→ ∫ f dµ,
with µ nonatomic, are continuous. By Lyapunov’s theorem the indicator functions are na-
dense in B1 (C). Therefore, any game ν, when viewed as the function 1A 7→ ν (A) defined on
the space of indicator functions, has at most one na-continuous extension to B1 (C). We use
na-extensions of newsvendor games in our main Theorem 3.2.
The newsvendor game is defined in (2.3) through a vector-valued measure D : C → X,
where X is a Banach space (specifically, X = L1 (Ω,F ,P), the space of integrable random
variables defined over a probability space (Ω,F ,P)). Diestel and Uhl (1977) is the standard
reference for them. We recall just some definitions.
An additive measure F : C → X is bounded, if
sup {‖F (A)‖ : A ∈ C} <∞. (7.1)
If F is countably additive then F is necessarily bounded (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Cor.
19, p. 9)). We recall that we can associate with any F : C → X, its semivariation ‖F‖
which is a scalar subadditive set-function (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 2)). The measure
F is said to be of bounded semivariation if ‖F‖ (I) < +∞. Any countably additive vector
measure F is of bounded semivariation (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Proposition 11, p. 4)).
Given a vector measure F : C → X, the variation of F is the extended nonnegative
measure |F | defined as |F | (A) = suppi
∑
B∈pi ‖F (B)‖, where the supremum is taken over all
partitions of A into a finite number of pairwise disjoint members of C. If |F | (I) < +∞, F
is then called of bounded variation, a more stringent condition than bounded semivariation.
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We recall that if µ ∈ ca (C), a µ-measurable function f : I → X, where X is a Banach
space, is Bochner integrable if
∫ ‖f‖ dµ < ∞, where ‖f‖ is the norm function: ‖f‖ (i) =
‖f (i)‖ (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 45)). Given a µ-Bochner integrable function f : I → X,
we can define the X-valued measure F (A) =
∫
A
f dµ, for A ∈ C.
Section 6
We prove results of Section 6 first because they are used in the proofs of the other results.
Define the function ϕ : R→ R as
ϕ(t) =
{
h · t if t ≥ 0,
−(pi + p) · t if t < 0, (7.2)
and the operator Γ : L1 (Ω,F ,P)→ R as
Γ (X) = min
y∈R
E [ϕ (y −X)] . (7.3)
The following lemma relates the properties of the operators Γ and Π.
Lemma 7.1.
Π(X) = pE[X]− Γ(X). (7.4)
Proof. The result follows immediately from the relation ψ(x, y) = px− ϕ(y − x).
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Mu¨ller et al. (2002) proved that the operator Γ is positively homo-
geneous, convex, and comonotonically additive. Then properties (a), (b), and (c) follow di-
rectly from Lemma 7.1. Concerning (d), Mu¨ller et al. (2002) proved that argminy E[ϕ(y−X)]
is a (pi+p)/(h+pi+p)-quantile of the distribution of X, provided ϕ is given by (7.2). There-
fore the result follows from (7.4).
Proof of Proposition 6.2. Let X, Y ∈ L1 (Ω,F ,P). Since
−Π(X) = Γ(X)− pE[X],
and ϕ (t) ≤ γ1 |t|, with γ1 = max{h, pi + p}, we have
−Π(X) ≤ E[ϕ(−X)]− pE[X]
≤ γ1‖X‖+ p‖X‖
= γ‖X‖.
By subadditivity of −Π we have
−Π(X) = −Π(X − Y + Y )
≤ −Π(X − Y )− Π(Y )
≤ γ ‖X − Y ‖ − Π(Y ) ,
that is, Π (Y )−Π(X) ≤ γ ‖X − Y ‖. Interchanging the role of X and Y we obtain (6.1).
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Proof of Proposition 6.3. It is well known that
Y ∈ Π∗ if and only if 〈X,Y 〉 ≥ Π(X) for all X ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P).
First we prove that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied by any Y ∈ Π∗. Fix Y ∈ Π∗. We have
Π (X) = pE[X]−min
y
E [ϕ (y −X)] ≤ 〈X, Y 〉 , for all X ∈ L1.
Hence
min
y
E [ϕ (y −X)] ≥ 〈p− Y,X〉 ,
which implies
E [ϕ (y −X)] ≥ 〈p− Y,X〉 , for all X ∈ L1 and all y ∈ R. (7.5)
Fix an element X ∈ L1 and a scalar y 6= 0, and consider the parametrized family of random
variables Xλ = (λ− 1) y +X with λ ∈ R. We obtain
E [ϕ (λy −Xλ)] ≥ 〈p− Y,Xλ〉
E [ϕ (y −X)] ≥ (λ− 1) y 〈p− Y, 1〉+ 〈p− Y,X〉
which holds for all λ ∈ R. Clearly, this implies that 〈p− Y, 1〉 = 0 iff ∫ Y dP = p, namely,
condition (i).
By setting y = 0 and replacing X with −X in (7.5), we get E [ϕ (X)] ≥ 〈Y − p,X〉. In
view of (7.2), we have∫
X≥0
X (h+ p− Y ) dP+
∫
X<0
X (−Y − pi) dP ≥ 0
which must hold for all X. In particular, if X is nonnegative, we have
∫
X (h+ p− Y ) dP ≥
0 for all X ≥ 0. Clearly, this implies that Y ≤ h + p almost surely. By using nonpositive
random variables, we get Y ≥ −pi.
Conversely, we prove that any Y satisfying (i) and (ii) lies in Π∗. Consider the difference
E[ϕ (y −X)]− 〈p− Y,X〉
where X ∈ L1 and y ∈ R. In view of condition (i), we have 〈p− Y, y〉 ≡ 0, hence
E[ϕ (y −X)]− 〈p− Y,X〉 =
∫
Ω
ϕ (y −X) dP− 〈p− Y,X − y〉
=
∫
Ω
ϕ (Z) dP+ 〈p− Y, Z〉 ,
where Z = y −X. On the other hand,∫
Ω
ϕ (Z) dP+ 〈p− Y, Z〉 =
∫
Z≥0
Z (h+ p− Y ) dP+
∫
Z<0
Z (−Y − pi) dP ≥ 0,
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where the two addenda are nonnegative by condition (ii). This proves that E[ϕ(y −X)] ≥
〈p− Y,X〉 and, in turn, Π (X) ≤ 〈X, Y 〉 for all X ∈ L1 and therefore that Y ∈ Π∗.
To prove the last statement, it suffices to calculate 〈Y,X〉 − Π(X). Let y∗ be a (pi +
p)/(h + pi + p)-quantile of the distribution of X. Since X has a continuous distribution, it
follows that P (X = y∗) = 0. Therefore,
〈Y,X〉 − Π(X) =
∫
X≤y∗
(h+ p− Y ) (y∗ −X) dP+
∫
X≥y∗
(pi + Y ) (X − y∗) dP ≥ 0,
for all Y ∈ Π∗. Hence, Π (X)− 〈Y,X〉 = 0 if and only if Y = Y as defined in (6.4).
Section 2
Lemma 7.2. Assume that A→ D (A) is σ-additive. Then:
(i) ν is bounded,
(ii) ν is continuous,
(iii) core (ν) ⊂ ca (C),
(iv) there exists a nonnegative real-valued countably additive measure λ on (I, C) such that
core (ν) ⊂ ca (C, λ) ≡ L1 (I, C, λ)
Proof. (i) As D is σ-additive, D is bounded (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Cor. 19, p. 9)).
Namely, ‖D (A)‖ ≤ N for all A ∈ C and for some scalar N . In view of (6.1), we have
|ν (A) | ≤ γN and ν is bounded.
(ii) If, for instance, An ↑ A, then ‖D (An)−D (A)‖ → 0. Proposition 6.2 implies that
ν (An)→ ν (A).
(iii) It is well known that the core of games, that are continuous at ∅ and at the grand
coalition I, consists of countably additive measures (see Aumann and Shapley (1974,
p. 173) or Marinacci and Montrucchio (2004, Proposition 4.4)).
(iv) By Bartle-Dunford-Schwartz Theorem (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Cor. 6, p. 14))
there is a positive σ-additive measure λ such that λ (E) → 0 iff ‖D‖ (E) → 0 where
‖D‖ denotes the semivariation. In particular, we have the implications λ (E) =
0 =⇒ ‖D‖ (E) = 0 =⇒ ‖D (E)‖ = 0. If µ ∈ core (ν) and λ (E) = 0, then
µ (E) ≥ Π(D (E)) = 0. Moreover,
µ (E) = µ(I)− µ(I \ E)
≤ µ(I)− ν(I \ E)
= Π (D (I))− Π(D (I)−D (E))
= 0.
Hence, µ(E) = 0, which proves that µ is absolutely continuous with respect λ.
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Proof of Theorem 2.3. By Lemma 7.2(i) the game ν is bounded. Hence, to prove that it is
totally balanced it suffices to check that, for any coalition A ∈ C, if ∑i λi1Ai = 1A, where
{Ai}i are finitely many coalitions, then
∑
i λiν (Ai) ≤ ν (A). This classical result, due to
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967), holds also for positive infinite games, as proved by
Schmeidler (1967) and Kannai (1969). An extension to bounded (not necessarily positive)
games can be found in Marinacci and Montrucchio (2004, Theorem 4.1).
Given a simple function ϕ =
∑
i µi1Ai , D (ϕ) denotes
∑
i µiD (Ai). It is well known
that the map ϕ→ D (ϕ) is a linear operator on the space of simple functions. Hence, from∑
i λi1Ai = 1A, it follows
ν (A) = Π (D (A))
= Π
(∑
i
λiD (Ai)
)
≥
∑
i
λiΠ(D (Ai))
=
∑
i
λiν (Ai) .
Consequently the game is totally balanced.
Define now the additive measure µ (A) =
〈
Y ,D (A)
〉
, A ∈ C, where Y ∈ Π∗ is given by
Y = (p+ h)1{D≤y∗} − pi1{D≥y∗}.
In view of Proposition 6.3, we have ν (I) = Π (D (I)) =
〈
Y ,D (I)
〉
= µ (I). Moreover,
for all A ∈ C, ν (A) = Π (D (A)) ≤ 〈Y ,D (A)〉 = µ (A). Therefore µ ∈ core(ν). Clearly any
charge in core(ν) is bounded, provided ν is bounded.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. If all the random variables Xi have the same distributions, then
µi = (p+ h)
∫
D(I)≤y∗
Xi dP− pi
∫
D(I)≥y∗
Xi dP
is independent of i. Suppose now that the Xi are exchangeable. Let ξ : Id → Id be any
permutation. If λ ∈ core (ν), then λξ ∈ core (ν), where λξ (A) = λ (ξA). If λ is an extremal
point of core (ν), then λξ is, too. Hence µ agrees with
∑
ξ(d!)
−1λξ, since
∑
ξ(d!)
−1λξ is
uniform over Id. Note that the elements λξ are not necessarily all different but they can
be regrouped into distinct classes of the same cardinality. Therefore µ =
∑
ξ(d!)
−1λξ is the
barycenter of core (ν).
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Fix A ∈ C. Set X1 = D (A) and X2 = D (I). By assumption, X1
and X2 are comonotone. Hence, Π (X1 +X2) = Π (X1) + Π (X2). Set
Π∗1 = {Y ∈ Π∗ : 〈Y,X1〉 = Π(X1)}
Π∗2 = {Y ∈ Π∗ : 〈Y,X2〉 = Π(X2)}
Π∗3 = {Y ∈ Π∗ : 〈Y,X1 +X2〉 = Π(X1 +X2)} .
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Clearly Π∗1 ∩ Π∗2 = Π∗3. For, if Y ∈ Π∗1 ∩ Π∗2,
Π (X1 +X2) = Π (X1) + Π (X2) = 〈Y,X1〉+ 〈Y,X2〉
= 〈Y,X1 +X2〉
and Y ∈ Π∗3. The converse can be proved in a similar way.
As Π∗3 is nonempty, there exist some Y ∈ Π∗1∩Π∗2. The measure µ (E) =
〈
Y ,D (E)
〉
lies in
the core by construction. Further, µ (A) =
〈
Y ,D (A)
〉
=
〈
Y ,X1
〉
= Π(X1) = Π (D (A)) =
ν (A). This proves that the game is exact.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Set σ =
√
Var[D(A)]. The random variable Z = σ−1(D(A) −
E[D(A)]) is of the same type as D(A), and has zero mean and unit variance. Hence D(A) =
σZ + E[D(A)], which remains valid also when Var[D(A)] = 0. Therefore
ν (A) = pE[D(A)]− Γ (D (A))
= pE[D(A)]− Γ(Z)σ
= pE[D(A)]− k
√
Var[D (A)],
where k = Γ(Z). Clearly Γ(Z) ≤ γ‖Z‖1 ≤ γ‖Z‖2 = γ, by Ho¨lder’s inequality.
As far as the last statement is concerned, it suffices to observe that in this case the set
function A→ Var[D (A)] is additive. Actually, A ∩B = ∅ implies
Var[D (A ∪B)] = Var [D (A) +D(B)]
= Var[D (A)] + Var[D (B)] + 2Cov [D (A) , D (B)]
= Var[D (A)] + Var[D (B)].
Since t→ −t1/2 is convex, it is well known that −k√Var[D(A)] is supermodular. Therefore
ν(A) is supermodular, too, since A 7→ pE[D(A)] is additive.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Representation (2.6) follows easily from (2.5). If the demands are
exchangeable, then mi ≡ m for all i, σii = σ2, and σij = σ2ρ for i 6= j. This leads to
(2.8). The function t 7→ pmt − k√(1− ρ)t+ ρt2 is convex over R+, hence these games
are supermodular, provided the Xi are exchangeable. We need to prove that (2.7) gives an
element in the core. Observe that the game ν (A) = pm′XeA − k (e′AΣeA)1/2 has a natural
extension to [0, 1]n, given by the function ν˜ (x) = pm′Xx − k (x′Σx)1/2, with x ∈ [0, 1]n
and where a coalitions A is identified with the extremal points eA of [0, 1]
n. The function
ν˜ (x) is concave and linearly homogeneous. Furthermore ν˜ (x) is differentiable, consequently
the derivative D ν˜ (x) at the diagonal point 2−1e, with e = eI , is a superdifferential. By
a standard argument (see the proof of Theorem 3.2), the derivative belongs to core (ν).
Straightforward computations lead to D ν˜ (2−1e) = pmX − k (e′Σe)−1/2Σe, which is the
desired result.
Proof of Proposition 2.8. (i): The profit ψ(x, y) in (2.1) can be written as ψ(x, y) = p(x ∧
y)− φ(y − x). Hence
Π(X) = max
y
pE[X ∧ y]− E[φ(y −X)].
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If pi = 0, then we have E[ψ(X, 0) = pE[X ∧ 0] − E[φ(−X)] = 0, provided X ≥ 0. We infer
that Π(X) ≥ 0, and (i) is proved.
(ii): Consider first a uniformly integrable family Xα with E[Xα] = 1. Straightforward
algebra leads to
(p+ pi + h)E[ψ(Xα, y)]
= y P(Xα ≥ y) + pi
p+ h+ pi
(∫
Xα<y
Xα dP− 1
)
+
1
p+ h+ pi
(
(p+ h)
∫
Xα<y
Xα dP− hy
)
. (7.6)
Evaluate the right hand side of (7.6) at y = tp/h, where t is a fixed element of (0, 1). Notice
that y → ∞, as p → ∞. The first two addenda of (7.6) go to zero as p → ∞, uniformly in
α (notice that
∫
Xα≥yXα dP ≥ y P(Xα ≥ y)). The last addendum approaches 1 − t > 0, as
p→∞, uniformly in α. We deduce that Π(Xα) ≥ E[ψ(Xα, y)] ≥ 0 for p ≥ p0 independently
of α. The result is easily proved by using the family of uniformly integrable random variables
XA = D(A)/E[D(A)] and observing that
ν(A) = Π(D(A)) = E[D(A)] Π
(
D(A)
E[D(A)]
)
.
Section 3
The following technical lemmata are crucial to prove our main theorem. Notice that the
functional Π is clearly weakly upper semicontinuous, since Π is concave, but it may fail to
be weakly continuous over L1 (Ω,F ,P).
Lemma 7.3. The function Π is weakly continuous when restricted to any relatively norm
compact subset of L1 (Ω,F ,P).
Proof. LetK ⊂ L1 (Ω,F ,P) be relatively norm compact andB∗ be the unit ball of L∞ (Ω,F ,P).
First we prove that the bilinear map (X,Y )→ 〈X, Y 〉 is jointly continuous over K ×B∗
where K is endowed with the weak topology and B∗ with the weak* topology.
With each X ∈ K, we associate the continuous function X̂ ∈ C (B∗), defined by X̂ (Y ) =
〈X, Y 〉. Observe that the linear map X → X̂ is an isometry. Actually, by Hanh-Banach
theorem
‖X‖L1 = maxY ∈B∗ |〈X,Y 〉| = maxY ∈B∗
∣∣∣X̂ (Y )∣∣∣ = ∥∥∥X̂∥∥∥
∞
,
where ‖·‖∞ is the supnorm of C (B∗). Since K is relatively norm compact, so is the image
set K̂. By Ascoli-Arzela`’s theorem, the family of functions X̂ in K̂ is equicontinuous. Fix
(X0, Y0) ∈ K ×B∗. We have
|〈X, Y 〉 − 〈X0, Y0〉| =
∣∣∣X̂(Y )− X̂0 (Y0)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣X̂(Y )− X̂ (Y0)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣X̂(Y0)− X̂0 (Y0)∣∣∣ .
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Given an ε > 0, there exists a weak* neighborhood U (Y0) of Y0 such that
∣∣∣X̂(Y )− X̂ (Y0)∣∣∣ ≤
ε/2 for all X ∈ K, due to the equicontinuity of K̂. Further, there is a weak neighborhood
U
(
X̂0
)
of X̂0 such that X ∈ U
(
X̂0
)
∩ K implies
∣∣∣X̂(Y0)− X̂0 (Y0)∣∣∣ ≤ ε/2. Therefore,
|〈X, Y 〉 − 〈X0, Y0〉| ≤ ε, for all (X, Y ) ∈ U
(
X̂0
)
× U (Y0). This proves the continuity of the
bilinear function 〈·, ·〉.
Consider now our functional
Π (X) = min
Y ∈Π∗
〈X, Y 〉 , X ∈ K.
Clearly the property shown above still holds if one replaces K × B∗ by K × B∗ρ , where
B∗ρ = ρB
∗ is the ball with radius ρ. Chose B∗ρ such that Π
∗ ⊆ B∗ρ . Therefore the function
Π turns out to be weakly continuous over K by Berge’s maximum theorem (see Aliprantis
and Border (1994, Theorem 16.31)).
Lemma 7.4. Assume that in the newsvendor game ν (A) = Π (D (A)) the demand vector
measure satisfies (3.1). Then the game ν admits an na-continuous extension to the set of
the ideal coalitions B1 (C), which is concave and positively homogeneous.
Proof. Consider the map T : L∞ (I, C, λ) → R, given by f → ∫ f dD. It is well defined, as
λ (A) = 0 implies D (A) = 0. By a consequence of Bartle-Dunford-Schwartz’s theorem, the
map T is a weak*-to-weak continuous linear operator (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Corollary
7, p. 14)). Restrict this operator to the subset
I∞ (λ) = {f ∈ L∞ (I, C, λ) : 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, λ -a.e.} . (7.7)
Clearly, T (I∞ (λ)) is the extended range of the vector measure D. By Uhl’s theorem (see
Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 10, p. 206)), the extended range in norm compact. By
invoking Lemma 7.3, we deduce that the functional f → Π (∫ f dD) is weak* continuous
over I∞ (λ). Consider the space B1 (C) of the ideal coalitions. As λ is nonatomic, the map
f → [f ] from B1 (C) to I∞ (λ) is na-to-weak* continuous. As a consequence, the functional
ν∗ (f) = Π
(∫
f dD
)
is the na-continuous extension of the game ν to the ideal coalitions,
and is concave and linearly homogeneous.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof is somewhat related to Einy et al. (1999, Theorem A),
although they use dna-continuous extensions and here we exploit the na-extension ν∗ (f)
defined over I∞ (λ), as defined in (7.7) of Lemma 7.4. We think of I∞ (λ) ⊂ L∞ (I, C, λ),
endowed with two topologies. The first one is the strong topology of the uniform convergence.
The second one is the weak* topology. Consider the superdifferential ∂ν∗ (2−11I) of the
concave function ν∗ : I∞ (λ) → R at the point 2−11I . The elements of ∂ν∗ (2−11I) lie in
(L∞ (I, C, λ))′ = ba (I, C, λ).
If p ∈ ∂ν∗ (2−11I), we have
ν∗ (f) ≤ 2−1ν (I) + 〈p, f〉 − 2−1p (I)
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for all f ∈ I∞ (λ). Setting f = 0 and f = 1I , we deduce that p (I) = ν (I). Setting f = 1A,
for any coalition A, we obtain p (A) ≥ ν (A). Consequently, p ∈ core (ν). By Lemma 7.2,
p ∈ L1 (I, C, λ). Hence, ∂ν∗ (2−11I) ⊆ core (ν) ⊂ L1 (I, C, λ).
We now prove that core (ν) = ∂ν∗ (2−11I). Let m ∈ core (ν). We know that m ∈
L1 (I, C, λ) and m (A) ≥ ν (A) for all A ∈ C. Namely, 〈m, 1A〉 ≥ ν∗ (1A). Both ν∗ and 〈m, .〉
are w∗-continuous. By Lyapunov theorem (see Kingman and Robertson (1968)), the indica-
tor functions are weak* dense. Hence 〈m, f〉 ≤ ν∗ (f) holds for all f ∈ I∞ (λ). Therefore
ν∗ (f) ≤ ν∗ (2−11I)+ 〈m, f − 2−11I〉
and m ∈ ∂ν∗ (2−11I).
As a last step, we prove that ∂ν∗ (2−11I) is a singleton, namely that ν∗ is (Gateaux)
differentiable at 2−11I . First observe that the superdifferential of the concave functional Π
is given by
∂Π(X) = {Y ∈ Π∗ : 〈Y,X〉 = Π(X)}.
Consequently, ifD(I) has a continuous distribution, then Proposition 6.3 implies ∂Π(2−11I) =
∂Π(1I) = {Y }, where Y is given by (6.4).
Now compute the directional derivative of ν∗ at 2−11I , that is
D ν∗
(
2−11I ;h
)
= lim
t→0+
ν∗ (2−11I + th)− ν∗ (2−11I)
t
with h ∈ L∞ (I, C, λ). Denoting Tf = ∫ f dD and T ∗ its transpose, we obtain
D ν∗
(
2−11I ;h
)
= lim
t→0+
Π(D (I) + 2tTh)− Π(D (I))
2t
=
〈
Y , Th
〉
=
〈
T ∗Y , h
〉
,
where Y = DΠ(D (I)). Since the directional derivative is linear, ν∗ is differentiable at 2−11I .
As a consequence, ∂ν∗ (2−11I) = core (ν) is a singleton. In view of Theorem 2.3 the element
in the core is given by (2.4).
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Notice the following facts:
(i) If we restrict the operator Π to some Lp (Ω,F ,P) with p ∈ (1,∞), we get again the
representation
Π (X) = min
Y ∈Π∗
〈Y,X〉
for all X ∈ Lp (Ω,F ,P), where Π∗ is characterized by Proposition 6.3. This can be
quickly checked, as Π∗ is weakly compact in any Lp (Ω,F ,P) with 1 ≤ p < ∞. For a
direct proof it suffices to remark that the proof of Proposition 6.3 remains unchanged
if we set the restriction X ∈ Lp (Ω,F ,P). This representation implies that, provided
D (I) has continuous distribution, the equality ∂Π(2−1D (I)) =
{
Y
}
holds for the
functionals Π : Lp (Ω,F ,P)→ R, as well.
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(ii) Lemma 7.2 is unchanged. Therefore Π : Lp (Ω,F ,P) → R is weakly continuous over a
relatively norm-compact subset of Lp (Ω,F ,P).
(iii) If D : C → Lp (Ω,F ,P) is σ-additive and of bounded variation, set λ = |D|, which is
the bounded variation measure. Clearly, D is |D|-continuous. By Phillips’s theorem
(see Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 76))) any Lp (Ω,F ,P), with p ∈ (1,∞) has the Radon-
Nikodym property. Consequently, the measure D admits the representation D (A) =∫
A
δdλ. Notice that λ = |D| is non-atomic, as long as D is.
In view of these facts, the proof goes through like the one of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Assume by contradiction the existence of a coalition A, such that
D (A) 6= 0 and for all A1, A2 ⊆ A, with A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, D (A1) and D (A2) are uncorrelated.
Consider the restriction νA to the coalition A of the game ν. νA turns out to be nonatomic and
of bounded variations. As D takes values on L2, we can invoke Corollary 3.3 and so core (νA)
is a singleton. On the other hand, by Proposition 2.6, νA is supermodular. If the core of
a supermodular game is a singleton, then the game is additive. In view of Proposition 2.6,
νA (B) = pE[D(B)] − k
√
Var[D (B)], for all B ⊆ A. Taking any two coalitions B ⊆ A
and A \ B, we have √Var[D (A)] = √Var[D (B)] +√Var[D (A \B)], which implies either
Var[D (B)] = 0 or Var[D (A \B)] = 0. Namely, either D (B) = 0 or D (A \B) = 0. The
coalition A would be an atom, a contradiction.
Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1. It is easy to see that the operator M (X) = αE [X] − β√Var [X]
is the support functional
M (X) = min
Y ∈M∗
〈Y,X〉
whereM∗ = {Y ∈ L2 (Ω,F ,P) : E [Y ] = α and Var [Y ] ≤ β2}. For anyX such that Var [X] 6=
0 there is a unique minimizer Y ∈ argminY ∈M∗ 〈Y,X〉 given by
Y = α− βX − E [X]√
Var [X]
.
The same arguments used in the proof of Theorem 2.3 lead to the first two claims. Clearly
the core is singleton as a consequence of Corollary 3.3.
Section 5
Proof of Proposition 5.1. In view of (5.1) we have
νd(A) = −
(
a2ρ+ a (1− ρ)
d2ρ+ d (1− ρ)
)1/2
, (7.8)
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where |A| = a. By Proposition 2.7 this game is supermodular. The imputations which are
the extreme points of core(νd) can be easily computed by using Shapley’s theorem (Shapley
(1971)). We recall that for a finite supermodular game the extreme points of the core are
one-to-one with the so-called marginal worth associated with the maximal chains. More
specifically, if ∅ = C0 ⊂ C1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Cd−1 ⊂ Cd = Id is a maximal chain, then there exists
one and only one measure µ that replicates the game νd on this chain, namely, such that
µ (Ci) = νd (Ci). Clearly, for all j ∈ Id, there is an index i such that {j} = Ci \Ci−1. Hence
µj := µ({j}) = νd (Ci)−νd (Ci−1). By taking the chain Ci = {1, 2, . . . , i} we get the extreme
point in the core µi = νd
(
Ci
)− ν (Ci−1). Clearly µi is increasing in i. Further, as the game
is symmetric, all the extreme points are obtained by permuting the sequence (µi).
Given an element ξ in the set Ξ of all permutations of {1, 2, . . . , d}, denote by µξ any such
measure obtained by permuting the sequence (µi). As a consequence of Bauer maximum
principle we have
Φ(νd) = max
ξ∈Ξ
‖µ− µξ‖ .
Assume first that the number d of players is even. It is easy to see that the maximum is
achieved by taking µξ = (µd, µd−1, . . . , µ1). Hence,
Φ(νd) = 2
d/2∑
i=1
(µd−i − µi)
= 2µ(Id \ Cd/2)− 2µ(Cd/2) (7.9)
= 2[µ(Id)− 2µ(Cd/2)]
= −2[1 + 2ν(Cd/2)].
Using (7.8), we obtain
1
2
Φ(νd) =
(
d2ρ+ 2d (1− ρ)
d2ρ+ d (1− ρ)
)1/2
− 1.
The diameter of the core is decreasing in ρ. Its value is zero when ρ = 1, which corre-
sponds to the case of comonotone demands. It is equal to 2
√
2− 2 for all d, when ρ = 0. If
ρ is fixed and ρ > 0, then Φ(νd)→ 0, as d→∞. Actually, we have
Φ(νd) =
1− ρ
ρ
[
d−1 − 5
4
(
1− ρ
ρ
)
d−2
]
+ o
(
d−2
)
which shows that the diameter of the core shrinks with rate 1/d.
If the number of players is odd, we get a similar result, where (7.9) is replaced by
Φ(νd) = −2[1 + νd(C(d−1)/2) + νd(C(d+1)/2)].
Proof of Proposition 5.2. In view of (2.6) the games νd are defined as
νd (A) = −
(
e′AΣdeA
e′IdΣdeId
)1/2
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for A ⊆ Id. We construct a new sequence of games ν˜d having multinormal exchangeable
demands with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ˜d, with elements σ˜ii(d) =
∑
j∈I σij(d)− (d−
1)η ≡ σ˜2, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and σ˜ij(d) = η for i 6= j.
Therefore ∑
(i,j)∈id×Id
σ˜ij(d) =
∑
(i,j)∈id×Id
σij(d),
and, for all A, ∑
(i,j)∈A×A
σ˜ij(d) ≥
∑
(i,j)∈A×A
σij(d).
Therefore νd(A) ≥ ν˜d(A) and νd (Id) = ν˜d (Id) = −1. Clearly, core (νd) ⊆ core (ν˜d).
The game ν˜d is of the type examined in Proposition 5.1. Since core (ν˜d) shrinks to a
singleton, so does core (νd).
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